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r 
I IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I 
BURTON DENBY 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Case No. 14841 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
ST A TEMENT OF CASE 
On May 21, 1976, a representative of the Department of Employment Security issued a 
decision finding appellant ineligible to receive unemployment compensation on the grounds 
appellant left work voluntarily without good cause. The representative assessed a 
disqualification of four weeks beginning March 21, 1976, and ending April 17, 1976. 
On May 31, 1976, a Department representative issued a decision finding the appellant 
ineligible for unemployment compensation on the grounds the appellant was not available 
for work, and assessing a disqualification beginning March 21, 1976, and ending when 
appellant meets the requirements for eligibility. 
Appellant appealed both decisions to an Appeals Referee. After due notice and hearing 
Which was co d d b 11 ucte Y a Montana Appeals Referee as agent for the Utah Department, and 
"' 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appeals Referee affirmed both decisions of the Department representative On Sept b 
· em er!, 
1976, the Board of Review affirmed the decision of the Appeals Referee The matte · 
· r 1s no1 
before this Court on a petition for review of the decision of the Board of Review, which wa; 
dated October 27, 1976. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of the Board of Review that appellant was no: I 
eligible for compensation during the period in question with instructions to the Departmern : 
I 
to pay appellant the usual and regular unemployment compensation for such period. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts is correct except in the following respects: 
I 
1. The record does not show as stated on page one of appellant's brief that appellant : 
terminated his employment due to an on-the-job injury. (R.0019, R.0020) 
2. The appeallant's search for work during the period from February 22, 1976, 
(R.0017) to June 2, 1976, the date of hearing, consisted of contacting approximately 
five persons. (R.0021) Appellant's work search was also limited to employment that ' 
would not earn in excess of the amount allowed before reduction of Social Securit! 
benefits. (R.0021) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL C0~~5[ 
SION UNDER THE UT AH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURNTED BY 
AFFIRM THE COMMISSION FINDINGS IF SUCH ARE SUSTAI 
SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Respondent is in agreement with appellant's statement that this Court's review of 
1 
. substantial 1 
determinations of the Department is limited to deciding whether there is 
. u 2~ • 
competent evidence to sustain such determinations. Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 · 
1 
7. 
_...... 
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iJJ,47? P. 2d 587 (1970). A reversal of an order of the Department denying compensation 
can only be justified if there is no substantial evidence to sustain the determination and the 
. i facts giving rise to a right to compensation are so persuasive that the Department's denial 
1135 clearly capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable. Kennecott Copper Corporation 
Einployees v. Department of Employment Security, 13 U. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962); 
Gocke v. Wiesley, 18 U. 2d 245, 420 P. 2d 44, 45 (1966). in Members of Iron Workers 
Union of Provo v. Industrial Commission 104, Utah 242, 248; 139 P. 2d 208,211, this Court 
Said: 
If there is substantial competent evidence to sustain the findings 
and decision of the Industrial Commission, this court may not set 
aside the decision even though on a review of the record we 
might well have reached a different result. 
POINT II 
THAT THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT IS TO BE LIBERALLY CON-
STRUED TO ACCOMPLISH ITS OBJECTS BUT SUCH RULE DOES NOT 
PERMIT AN EXTENTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION TO ONE 
WHOSE INITIAL OR CONTINUED UNEMPLOYMENT MAY BE VOLITIONAL. 
Section 35-4-5(a) provides: 
5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a 
waiting period: 
(a) For the week in which he has left work voluntarily without good cause, if so 
found by the commission, and for not less than one or more than the five next 
following weeks, as determined by the commission according to the circumstances 
tn each case, provided that when such individual has had no bona fide employment 
between the week in which he voluntarily left such work without good cause and the 
week_ m which he filed for benefits he shall be so disqualified for the week in which 
he filed for benefits and for not less than one or more than the five next 
following weeks. 
I . 
t is a generally acknowledged rule that Employment Security Acts are construed 
liberally to ac 1· h h . . . . comp is t e1r purposes and objectives. However, m Utah and elsewhere the 
courts construe the Acts in a manner which distinguishes those petitioning as beneficiaries 
of the Act who become unemployed for reasons attributable to themselves or whose failure 
to become reemployed may be attributable to their own actions or failure to act. This Court 
ha-. pre1iou· \ · 
J Y pointed out that the purpose of the Employment Security Act is to assist the 
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worker and his family in times when he is out of work without fault on his part K r 
· ennec011 
Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, supra. The Cou~ 
has also noted that the underlying legislative intent of the various disqualifying prov ·. 
ISJO"' 
of the Act is that the Department is to determine a claimant's eligibility for unemployrneui 
compensation by adhering to the volitional test, and declared the policy of the contributio~,. · 
provisions of the statute to be to establish financial reserves for the benefit of perso~. 
unemployed through no fault of their own. Olaf Nelson Construction Company 1. , 
Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 521, 243 P. 2d 951 (1952). 
POINT III 
THE DEPARTMENT AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR I\ 
DETERMINING THAT APPELLANT'S SEPARATION FROM EMPLOYMENT 
WAS VOLITIONAL. 
Consonant with the volitional test is the rule that one who retires of his own volition 
and without compulsion by company rules, policies or contracts, leaves work voluntaril; 
and without good cause. 76 Am. fur. 2d, Unemployment Compensation, Section 60. 
Counsel for appellant contends the notice of hearing (R.0027) was defective in that 11 
did not set forth voluntary leaving as an issue. It is readily conceded by respondent that the 
Rules and Regulations of the Department require notice and an opportunity to be heard in 
such manner as to protect the rights of the parties, as cited in appellant's brief. Put another 
way, 
The right to a hearing, where it exists, particularly under the Consti-
tution, is a right, no more and no less, to a hearing which is 
adequate to safeguard the rights for which such protection is af-
forded. 2 Am. fur. 2d, Administrative Law, Section 410. 
In the case of Goff v. Administrator of Division of Employment Security, 15? 501~ 
. . . . h d le notice of 268 (1968), 1t was held that one claiming unemployment compensation a amp 
't 10 
the potentially disqualifying issue and was not misled or deprived of an opportuni Y 1 
rty of the prepare for the hearing. The court based its determination on the tota 1 1 
h. " f the charge administrative proceedings, which the court found "clearly apprised im 0 
against him. I 
I 
4 df 
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b 
To render a hearing unfair, the defect or the practice complained 
of must be such as might lead to a denial of justice, or there must 
be an absence of one of the elements deemed essential to due 
process of law. 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Section 410. 
A review of the totality of the administrative proceedings in the instant case clearly shows 
that appellant was aware of the purpose of the hearing and that he had adequate 
opportunity to prepare. 
The decision of the Department Representative issued May 21, 1976, (R.0032) set forth 
not only the conclusion that appellant left work voluntarily without good cause, but also 
gave the findings in support of that conclusion. The appellant then filed with the 
Department a letter of appeal (R.0029) in which he reiterated his reasons for leaving his 
employment. 
When the appellant attended the hearing and was asked about his employment with the 
Post Office and subsequent termination (R.0018) he offered no objection and gave no 
indication that he felt less than adequately prepared to discuss the matter. 
Finally, it is noted that nowhere in his appeal to the Board of Review did appellant 
raise the question of inadequate notice, and it is mentioned for the first time only in 
appellant's brief to this Court. It is a well-settled principle of law that appellate review will 
be limited to matters raised at the lower level. 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error, Section 
545; See Footnote 11, wherein is cited the case of State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P. 2d 
640, 93 ALR 723 (1934), as illustrative of the position of this Court. That there may be 
exceptions to the general rule is only proper where its application would result in a clear 
miscarriage of justice. 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error, Section 726. 
That appellant had ample opportunity to present his case with respect to his 
termination is obvious from the hearing transcript. The pertinent portions of the appellant's 
testimony are contained in the following excerpts from the transcript: 
Q. What happened on February 15, 1976, to cause your termination? 
A: Well, I felt like this. Seventy years of age is the compulsory retirement 
age in the postal service. Very, very many don't reach 70 years of age - it's a 
job of extreme tensions and pressures, people pass out, heart attacks, nervous 
breakdowns, I just didn't feel like staying any longer. (R.0019) 
5 
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l Q: Were you having any physical problems A: Oh, I have physical problems all the time. (R.0019) I 
Appellant then proceeded to explain that his physical problems consisted of arthritis for I 
which he took medication that on occasions was dulling to the mind and that "th b 
' e osse1 
didn't know it ... " (R.0020) 
On two separate occasions in the hearing, the appellant admitted that his retiremeni 
was voluntary (R.0019 and R.0020). Nowhere in the hearing transcript or in any other pan 
of the record is there any reference to an on-the-job injury which aggravated the appellant's 
arthritic condition and rendered him unable to perform his duties, as alluded to in 
appellant's brief. 
Although an injury may, in appropriate circumstances, constitute good cause for 
leaving work, the record is totally devoid of even a suggestion that appellant's termination 
was due to such an event. To the contrary, appellant stated, in his "Notice of Appeal" 10 
the Appeals Referee (R.0033) that, "Many of the Postal Service die from heart attacks and 
nervous breakdowns, before reaching retirement age, due to pressure and tension, 1 wished 
to avoid this and continue living." That the appellant decided to no longer work under the , 
stress and tension associated with his employment is further evidenced by his statement to 
the Appeals Referee that, "I'm a pretty rugged character but this mental stress sometimes 
gets to be too much." (R.0021) 
Contrary to the assertion in appellant's brief (page 3), the Referee's decision was not 
based solely on a report obtained from the employer concerning the appellant's separation. 
The Referee's decision was based on a number of factors, including the lack of medical 
evidence to show that the appellant's physical condition prevented him from continuing 
employment (R.0013); the appellant's statement to the effect that, "The job was becoming 
increasingly difficult for me both psychologically and physically due to the mandatory 
overtime." (R.0013 and R.0019); and the appellant's failure to request exemption from the 
II t' testimony al overtime (R.0013). All of the foregoing are amply supported by the appe an s 
the hearing, as quoted and referred to in the preceding paragraphs. 
k " standard 
I 
I 
Counsel for appellant argues that appellant meets the "reasonable wor er 1 
_.l 
6 
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bz 
set forth in the respondent's General Rules of Adjudication, Voluntary Leaving, Section 
210. General Rules of Adjudication, Voluntary Leaving, Section 235.25, also cited in 
appeallant's brief, states: 
Alternatives to leaving work may also exist. Depending on the 
seriousness of the illness, ordinary prudence might dictate medical 
or surgical treatments without leaving work. For example, eye strain 
can be corrected by glasses without quitting. Other considerations 
are whether the worker gave his job a fair trial while ill or injured, 
whether he requested transfer to other work, and suitability of 
the work, considering the worker's health and safety and prospects 
of securing other work within his capabilities. (Emphasis added). 
The Board of Review and the Appeals Referee rightly concluded that the appellant did not 
pursue availabile alternatives before terminating. This conclusion is supported by the 
appellant's testimony that although the pills he took for arthritis could affect his ability, 
" ... The bosses didn't know it, but I knew it." (R.0020) 
POINT IV 
IN DETERMINING AVAILABILITY OF ONE WHO HAS VOLUNTARILY 
RETIRED, THE COMMISSION MAY ASSERT A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION 
OF WITHDRAW AL FROM THE LABOR FORCE. 
General Rules of Adjudication, Able and Available, Section 235.1 provides: 
In making a decision concerning available for work, the record 
of investigation should consider the individual's mental attitude 
toward becoming employed as compared to his mental attitude 
toward retirement. (Presumably, the two attitudes oppose each other 
when considering eligibility for unemployment benefits.) An in-
dividual's attitude toward becoming employed is demonstrated 
by the reason for his current unemployment, his incentives or lack 
of incentives to work, the conditions the labor market requires 
before it ordinarily accepts an individual into employment, and 
the individual's own efforts to become employed. 
Availability considerations should also be viewed in the light that 
an indivi?ual has, by his voluntary retirement, created a strong 
presumption of nonavailability. This presumption, however, may be 
overcome by circumstances indicating otherwise. 
Unemployment compensation is provided under a program insuring against wage loss 
the individual h · ·1 · w o is w1 lmg, able, and ready to accept suitable work or employment which 
he does not h 
ave good cause to refuse. He must be unequivocally exposed to the labor 
market. 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the case of Fleiszig v. Board of Review of Division of Unemplovment Com . 
- pensatwn 
of Department of Labor, 412 Ill. 49, 104 N.E. 2d 818, the Cout said: 
Moreover, the application for and receipt of retirement benefits and 
old age assistance clearly evidence an intention to retire from 
gainful labor, and disclose a mental attitude inconsistent with a 
genuine attachment to the labor market. 
In accord with this decision are Bennett v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security 
Division, 122 Ind. App. 37, 102 N.E. 2d 383; and Weisberg v. Catherwood, 28 App. Div. 
2d 1050, 283 N. Y. 2d 712. In Weisberg, a government employee who quit a temporary job 
to avoid exceeding income limits of Social Security benefits, was held to be not entitled to 
unemployment compensation. 
Of course, the presumption of withdrawal from the labor force may be rebutted by 
evidence of an active and reasonable effort to secure employment. 
POINTY 
THE DEPARTMENT AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR IN 
DETERMINING THAT APPELLANT WAS "NOT AVAILABLE FOR WORK" 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 35-4-4 U.C.A. 
Section 35-4-4 provides: 
An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits 
with respect to any week only if it has been found by the 
commission that: 
(c) He is able to work and is available for work. 
Counsel for appellant refers the Court to its decision in Gocke v. Wiesley, supra, as 
setting the standard to be applied in determining availability for work. The Court stated ' 
therein: 
... It seems that the claimant must act in good faith and make 
an active and reasonable effort to secure employment ... It is our 
belief that the broad purpose of the unemployment statute requires 
one to make a reasonable attempt to obtain employment. 
h. 1 area of hi~ It is appellant's contention on appeal that the liberally defined geograp 1ca 
'd reasonable i 
work search and his willingness to accept any suitable employment ev1 ence a 
k search area · 
search for work. Respondent takes no quarrel with the stated extent of the wor I 
R ... 
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r 
or appellant's willingness to accept work as a bartender, for which he has no experience. 
Despite appellant's willingness to accept employment within a broadly defined 
geographical area, he contacted only five persons in his search for work during the period of 
time commencing with his move to Fallon, Montana, on February 22, 1976, and ending on 
June 2, 1976, the date of hearing. (R.0021) Appellant made no other contacts during that 
period of time. (R.0023) 
Furthermore, appellant restricts his availability for work to a maximum earning level of 
$2,700-$2,800 so as not to effect a reduction in his Social Security benefits. (R.0021) 
The limited efforts exerted by the appellant over the extended period of time involved 
in this case are insufficient to overcome a presumption of withdrawal from the labor force. 
Even were such a presumption not to exist, the appellant's efforts, together with his 
earnings restriction, evidence no more than a passive willingness to accept work. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Board of Review and the Appeals Referee should be affirmed and 
benefits denied accordingly. 
9 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, 
Attorney General 
WINSTON FAUX 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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